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Oil rents and economic growth in oil-abundant MENA countries:
Governance is the trump card to escape the resource trap
Siham Matallah 1, Amal Matallah 2

Abstract
The present paper aims, on the one hand, to test the impact of oil rents on economic growth and
examine the main symptoms of the resource curse phenomenon in oil-abundant MENA
countries, and on the other hand, to investigate the role of governance in avoiding the resource
curse and turning oil rents into a tool for economic diversification in 11 MENA oil exporters
(Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,
and Yemen) over the period 1996-2014, by using pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects
and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. The main findings indicate that MENA
oil exporters’ growth is greatly and positively influenced by oil rents. Likewise, these
economies have been diagnosed with resource curse. The results also show that governance is
a key ingredient in the diversification recipe, while, oil rents frustrate economic diversification
by encouraging rent-seeking activities. The multiplicative interaction term between governance
index and oil rents indicates that the combined effect of these two variables is effective in
promoting diversification. In a nutshell, the enhancement of MENA oil-exporters’ good
governance capabilities is the way out of the resource curse because it can turn oil wealth into
a boon and offer these oil-abundant countries more opportunities for economic diversification
and thereby can enable them to generate robust and sustainable economic growth.
Keywords: Oil Rents; Economic Growth; Resource Curse; Governance; Oil-abundant MENA
countries
JEL Classification: O17, O43, O53, Q33, Q38.
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1. Introduction
The governance-natural resources nexus has been intensely debated in recent decades,
and many economists have highlighted the intrinsic role played by institutions and good
governance practices in escaping the resource curse and reversing it (Barro 1991; SachsWarner, 1995; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Mehlum et al., 2006;
Robinson et al, 2006). According to Elbra (2013) the resource curse can be perceived as “the
paradox by which mineral-rich states fail to keep pace, economically, with their non-mineralrich peers”; this anathema depicts the case where an abundance of natural resources does not
enable many countries to achieve high sustainable growth rates and poverty reduction goals
(Costa and Santos, 2013). Also, the resource curse phenomenon is often associated with
pervasive corruption, a lack of secure property rights, persistent high unemployment and glaring
income inequalities (Colgan, 2014). Sachs and Warner (1999) asserted that resource-rich
countries suffer from weak performing manufacturing sectors compared to resource-poor
countries, because resource rents swallow economic agents’ saliva and entice them to engage
in rent-seeking activities, breaking the backbone of economic growth.
Institutional frailty is a troubling truth behind the synchronization between resource
abundance and the vicious circle of unsustainable growth, because it ensures that resource rents
will be misguided and misused in unproductive rather than in productive directions. Moreover,
Alexeev and Conrad (2011) claimed that the overdependence on natural resource rents carries
harmful effects for the resource-rich country’s institutional context, and these effects can persist
for a long time, thus threatening long-term economic growth; this situation is perhaps common
to many resource-abundant transition countries that have experienced significant institutional
changes; and to make bad matters worse, point-source natural resource endowment often
hampers government’s willingness to proceed with necessary institutional reforms and hence
increasing signs of growth unsustainability.
Indeed, many historical facts have explored that resource-poor countries tend to grow
faster than resource-abundant countries; it's also worth bearing in mind that natural resource
wealth was not the main driving force behind the countries’ economic success in the past.
Despite abundant natural resources, Norway and Botswana have harnessed their natural
resource windfalls to generate robust growth rates, and their experiences serve as good lessons
to natural resource-endowed countries (Larsen, 2005; Holden, 2013). The Norwegian
government has isolated oil rents from politically-induced goals by allocating them to
productive investments under a transparent operational framework (Tsani, 2013). Similarly,
Acemoglu et al. (2002) pointed out that Botswana has successfully managed its natural resource
rents due to its sound governance practices and high-quality institutions especially in terms of
property rights that have hitherto been mainly influenced by pre-colonial institutions. This
shows the wisdom of insisting first and foremost on stepping up institutional reforms and
building up good governance that is the way out of the resource curse owing to its ability to
turn natural resource wealth into a boon and enable resource-abundant countries to generate
robust and sustainable economic growth. But what we’ll see if we change the viewing angle
and turn the spyglass towards oil-abundant MENA countries?
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In fact, MENA oil exporters, heavily dependent on oil export revenues, are vulnerable to
the triple whammy of falling oil prices, expenditure cutback and sluggish growth. If oil prices
stay low and remain in the dumps, then these countries are expected to post stinging losses in
oil royalties. This situation, combined with unchanged spending, will cause the budget surplus
in some countries to dwindle, and of course other countries, especially those with insufficient
buffers, will not be denied a galloping budget deficit. Actually, the need for setting up
precautionary buffers to cope with oil price volatility and deal with emergencies has long been
felt, but even substantial buffers can be fully exhausted if oil prices continue to slide.
Unfortunately, besides the looming problem of the resource curse, the plunge in oil prices may
not leave policy makers elbow room for maneuver, and this could be the straw that breaks the
camel's back. The deep roots of today's emergency situation can be revealed with a glance back
at these countries’ governance and institutional tissue. This paper thus aims to unearth very
interesting and research-worthy aspects of this intractable situation by testing, on the one hand,
the impact of oil rents on economic growth and examine the main symptoms of the resource
curse phenomenon in oil-abundant MENA countries, and, on the other hand, by investigating
the role of governance in avoiding the resource curse and turning oil rents into a tool for
economic diversification in 11 MENA oil exporters (Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen) over the period 19962014. Therefore, the paper is divided into five sections. After introducing the topic in section
1, section 2 presents the theoretical background and empirical indicia relating to the triptych
resource curse-good governance-economic growth, section 3 discusses oil rents, economic
growth and good governance in oil-abundant MENA countries, section 4 introduces the data,
explains the methodology, and analyzes the empirical results and finally section 5 concludes
the paper and draws some policy implications.

2. Theoretical and Empirical Review on Resource Curse and Good
Governance and the Links with Economic Growth
A- The Resource Curse: Implications and a Glance at Successful Experiences
The resource curse reflects the case where natural resource wealth is associated with poor
economic performance (Bjorvatn et al., 2012). In a nutshell, the following are the main
symptoms of the resource curse phenomenon: (1) the exaggerated reliance on natural resources;
(2) the frustrating effect of real exchange rate appreciation, resulting from natural resource
exports, on other economic sectors; (3) the short-term rise in inflation; (4) the commensurate
fall in consumption in response to high commodity prices; (5) the inefficient control over public
spending; (6) the pervasiveness of corruption (Costa and Santos, 2013).
As a matter of fact, natural resource rents are often used to fuel government spending on
infrastructure, telecommunication, health care and educational services; thus, they can promote
economic growth, but the puzzling fact is that the impact of those rents remains positive, then
after a certain threshold it turns negative, especially under institutional deficiencies (Papyrakis
and Gerlagh, 2004; Mehrara, 2009). It is widely held among economists that resource rents can
switch entrepreneurs’ interest from productive endeavors to rent-seeking activities and hence
economic growth will be severely hampered (Bjorvatn et al., 2012). Further, natural resource
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abundance can cause structural distortions which may have a growth-reducing impact (Bjorvatn
and Farzanegan, 2013). Large-scale resource extraction activities can lead to higher real wages
and real exchange rate appreciation, hindering competitiveness and production in non-resource
sectors (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). Also, the resource abundance may lead to low levels of
human development and high levels of poverty and inequality by inducing governments to
swerve aside from welfare-enhancing policies (Al-Kasim et al., 2013). As well as, the
overwhelming reliance on natural resources generates a poor institutional framework and
market failure which in turn further dampen the economy’s growth potential (Boyce and Emery,
2011).
Sachs and Warner (1995) indicated that natural resource-endowed countries tend to grow
slower than resource-poor countries. But actually natural resource-abundant countries like
Norway and Botswana are often cited as successful examples of harnessing natural resource
wealth for economic growth. In fact, the Norwegian government has skillfully managed its oil
revenues, owing to its belief that the oil wealth belongs to the whole country and it should be
wisely used to benefit the entire population. Norway was keen to involve national oil companies
in the petroleum industry, because ensuring that natural resources are extracted by national
companies is the major stride towards the resource blessing (Pomfret, 2012). Further, oil rents
were invested abroad through the Government Pension Fund. Importantly, the Norwegian
companies have entered national and international capital markets, thus securing sufficient
funding for profitable investments and it is worthwhile to note that democracy and stability
have arisen in Norway before the discovery of oil; also, the institutional basis has long been
supported by the well-functioning bureaucracy, low levels of corruption, and law enforcement
(Holden, 2013). Likewise, Acemoglu et al. (2003) indicated that Botswana has successfully
managed to escape the resource curse through enforcing property rights, providing checks and
balances on the executive power, and facilitating infrastructure investment. By contrast,
surrounding resource-rich nations like Angola, Sierra Leone and Congo plagued by poor
institutional quality have had struggling economies. As a matter of fact, many oil-exporting
developing countries fail to generate sustained economic growth, and this may be partly
explained by the fact that the oil sector leaves no room for investing in the other non-oil sectors
(Stevens and Dietsche, 2008).
B- The Natural Resource Trap: How Much Do Governance and Institutions Matter?
Bjorvatn et al. (2012) asserted that the massive rent-seeking behavior associated with
resource endowment can cause a pallid growth, and even more it can trigger a lengthy period
of political unrest. Further, Kolstad and Wiig (2009) pointed out that the resource wealth often
causes a dysfunctional behavior, especially in a prosaic institutional structure. In point of fact,
uncertainty, political strife and economic recession may result when greedy elites exploit
natural resources ruthlessly for their own self-interests, ignoring the public interest (Jayakar
and Martin, 2012). To make matters worse, resource-endowed countries may use resource rents
to put out the fire of potential internal conflicts and buy peace, and it is worthwhile to note that
the resource abundance helps sustain bad political regimes and undermine any transition to
democracy (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). However, resource-rich countries with good
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institutions designed for conflict prevention and stability maintenance are, therefore, less
vulnerable to such dire situations that not only exacerbate the resource curse but also make
political and economic bombs that can explode at any moment (James and Aadland, 2011).
In the same vein, Kolstad and Søreide (2009) emphasized that corruption is the underlying
force behind the poor economic performance of resource-rich countries. Additionally, the
corrupt behavior stemmed from increasing resource rents encourages individuals to seek a piece
of the resource pie instead of engaging in productive activities. Also, corruption persuades
politicians to stay in power, causing a tremendous lack of accountability, inefficient allocation
of public funds and serious distortions in the economy. More precisely, power-hungry
governors in resource-rich countries take advantage as much as possible and keep themselves
engaged in corrupt conduct and wasteful rent-seeking behavior, thus they deprive their
economies of prosperity (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). For instance, countries endowed with
substantial natural resources may regard trade liberalization as superfluous under harsh
environments plagued by institutional deficiencies and corruption (James and Aadland, 2011).
Undoubtedly, corruption and political conflict resulting from resource abundance make policy
makers less inclined to uphold the country’s economy and induce them to deliver low quality
public goods and services, and ignore citizens' needs (Neumayer, 2004; Cavalcanti et al., 2011).
Moreover, natural resource-endowed countries’ ruling elites tend to build an institutional
tissue that enables them to seize resource rents, they also inhibit democratic accountability and
make no effort to improve institutions that regulate private sector activities, affect the relative
profitability of productive activities, and curb rent-seeking activities (Ross, 2001; Kolstad and
Søreide, 2009). In general, poor institutional quality induces politicians' tendency towards the
inefficient use of resource rents to pursue their electoral goals (Robinson et al., 2006). In
contrast, a strong institutional basis can preserve resource-rich countries from the ravenous
behavior of politicians and bureaucrats (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008). In fact, the impact of
natural resource booms counts on political institutions which can hold politicians accountable
and enable countries to reap the benefits of their resource wealth (Robinson et al., 2006). In
addition, transparency helps counteract the bane of natural resource richness (Oskenbayev et
al., 2013). Similarly, Stevens and Dietsche (2008) emphasized that transparency can safeguard
sound public finances, build citizens’ trust in their governments, and enhance government’s
credibility and accountability. Thus, the lack of transparency can severely exacerbate resource
curse problems and undermine economic growth. Admittedly, ample research evidence
confirms that the institutional improvement helps escaping the pitfalls of the resource curse;
therefore, countries suffering from this damn should increase their protection of property rights
and enforce vigorous anti-corruption policies and procedures (Costa and Santos, 2013).
It can be concluded that natural resources are not the only driving force behind the
resource curse but also low-quality institutions dampen economic growth and make matters
worse (Boschini et al., 2013). Thus, the problem lies not in the resource abundance, but in the
way of managing resource rents, and the ability of policy makers to establish the appropriate
institutional structure and implement growth-promoting policies (Cavalcanti et al., 2011).
Indeed, low levels of corruption, solid rule of law and robust democratic institutions can ensure
prudent management of windfall gains from natural resources and improve fiscal performance
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and hence foster economic growth (El Anshasy and Katsaiti, 2013). As well as, natural
resource-endowed countries must change track to ride the wave of prosperity by focusing on
economic diversification that can broaden their economic base and provide insulation from the
resource curse (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Wiig and Kolstad, 2012).
C- Diversification: A Way Out of The Resource Curse, But What About The Main
Binding Constraints Facing This Process?
Economic diversification is a better shield against the resource curse by widening the
country's economic base in a way that progressively delinks economic growth from resource
abundance. In fact, diversification highlights differences in growth patterns between resourcerich countries and those poorly endowed with natural resources (Parlee, 2015); it also means
that the economic growth is drawn from more than one sector, and it can take place within a
specific sector or it can simply reduce the extent of concentration across sectors (Wiig and
Kolstad, 2012). Chile, Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico and Sweden, for example, explain
how some resource-rich countries were able to find ways to reduce their resource dependency
and successfully diversify their economies and why they have done better than others in terms
of maintaining sound economic growth (Joya, 2015).
Economic diversification is a pillar of sustainable economic growth, it is the process by
which resource-rich countries counteract instability and escape the worldwide slump in
resource prices. Furthermore, diversification has the ability to solve the unemployment problem
and point institutions in the right direction, and hence, it is a cornerstone of the peacebuilding
process. Since it is evident that diversification entails substantial benefits in many crucial ways,
the following question immediately comes to mind: why don't oil-abundant countries diversify
more?, there are many reasons for this, such as the lack of clear guidelines on diversification,
the entire support to heavily energy-dependent industries, the inadequate support to non-oil
sectors, and the private sector's dependence on government spending (Albassam, 2015). Omgba
(2014) claimed that export diversification is greatly and positively influenced by the time period
elapsing between oil production starting date and independence date, for example older oilproducing countries will have had enough time to diversify their export bases, as compared to
those that recently started exporting oil. Perhaps the answer is hovering around political
interests; in other words, the diversification process can pose a sufficiently serious threat to the
incumbent's hold on power which in turn can make any potential economic benefits too small
to be seen with the naked eye, because garnering and maintaining political power already
ensures retaining gains. Actually, the ruling elite’s satisfaction with available sources of income
is strong enough to keep the doors locked in front of diversification strategies especially those
that exert a menace over the seats of power. A further implication, here, is that even if a process
of diversification has been taking place, then it will be more skewed towards political payoffs
at the expense of societal ones. This explains why the implementation of genuine diversification
policies has failed to bear fruit in many resource-rich developing countries (Wiig and Kolstad,
2012).
Moreover, the pace of diversification is greater in resource-poor countries where
colonizers created settlement colonies and brought with them good institutions, than in
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resource-rich countries where settlers set up extractive colonies, in which institutions were
ideally designed to effectively extract resources, it's also worth bearing in mind that these
institutions persisted after independence due to the ruling elite's goals and worries (Acemoglu
et al., 2001). Indeed, the better the resource-rich countries’ institutional quality is, the more
likely these countries’ economic base will be diversified. Diversification depends greatly on
resource-rich countries’ institutional quality, or more simply put, good quality institutions offer
resource-abundant countries more opportunities for export basket diversification, and give them
much greater immunity to export concentration and resource trap. Additionally, diversification
requires reducing the tax burden on non-oil sectors and waiving trade restrictions biased
towards oil products (Wiig and Kolstad, 2012). Further, resource rents can serve as productive
assets, contributing to economic diversification, which in turn can offer an easy way out of the
resource curse dilemma by efficiently allocating resources to their most productive uses (Joya,
2015), and it is also important to emphasize here the leading role played by education in
enabling and empowering people, strengthening their own capacities and making them aware
that their actions are of paramount importance in supporting the country's economic
diversification. In general, achieving diversification requires a burning desire instead of
dreading the cost of the process. Obviously, the first step in embarking on promising
diversification processes is to build a thoughtful and measurable plan with realistic, clearly
defined, and action-oriented goals, and it's worth mentioning that this plan should be executable
(Albassam, 2015).
D- The Triptych Good Governance-Diversification-Economic Growth: Is Natural
Resource Wealth a Boon or a Bane?
The interaction between natural resource revenues and prosaic forms of governance can
render resource-rich countries financially underdeveloped, and lead to imprudent fiscal and
monetary policies, weakening the foundation on which economic diversification and
sustainable growth build (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2014; Weinthal and Luong, 2006).
Additionally, the shift from productive activities to rent-seeking activities lies on the activity’s
profitability, which in turn requires an efficient business environment supported by good
governance (Omgba, 2015). According to Karshenas and Hakimian (2005) export
diversification is driven by both domestic and foreign private investment that is responsive to
the quality of institutions. Likewise, human capital development is a key ingredient in the
diversification recipe that requires more than the existing human capital used in the easy oilgrowth, this capital can grow only within a proper institutional framework that reduces the
magnetic coupling between resource rents and corrupt practices, because this dangerous
explosive mixture is the arch-enemy of human capital development in resource-abundant
countries, thus, along with human capital development, diversification can make a giant and
constructive stride forward in widening the doors of employment opportunities, thereby
enhancing growth prospects (Al-Rawashdeh et al, 2013). While, poor governance contributes
appreciably to the depletion and degradation of natural resources, instead of spending them to
lay the basis for economic diversification and sustainable growth. In fact, the building up of
powerful institutions is the only mediator that can reconcile the twin goals of diversifying
economic activity and yielding benefits from natural resource endowment. Admittedly, good
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governance practices cannot only pressure governments to use resource wealth wisely in paving
the way for fledgling sectors, but also create and maintain a healthy business climate in which
these sectors can flourish and make significant contributions to national economies
(OECD/United Nations, 2011).
The successful injection of governance into the field of the resource curse has led Iimi
(2007) to conclude that most governance indicators that influence economic diversification to
allow for a sustainable growth path are as follows: First, voice and accountability does a lot to
prevent resource-rent dissipation, especially by monitoring those in authority and holding them
accountable, hence the diversification process can be initiated and guided by the pursuit of the
public interest. Second, government effectiveness enhances the ability of civil servants to
deliver quality public services and requires them to understand their responsibilities, develop
new competences, and implement good resource management policies according to the growth
and diversification requirements. Third, the absence of regulatory quality makes it easier for
the government to pursue market-unfriendly policies and impose excessive and onerous
regulatory burdens, thus hindering natural resource development and frustrating diversification
by leaving the resource sector bleeding in public hands. Fourth, control of corruption reflects
the effective implementation of anticorruption policies that are crucial for clear, transparent,
non-discriminatory distribution of resource benefits, and that tend to be conducive to adopt
appropriate resource management practices and hence they can best serve the diversification
process and help resource-rich countries to attain sustainable economic growth. Further, the
presence of extensive and vigorous anti-corruption policies curtails the ruling elite's attempt to
use resources and act in their own best and narrow interests rather than in the interests of the
people (Iimi, 2007). In a nutshell, these four pillars support a diversification away from overreliance on natural resources and seem to transform resource wealth in a way that can generate
stable and sustainable growth rates, or more aptly put, governance framework determines
whether the resource abundance turns out to be a boon or a bane for natural resource-abundant
countries.
The impact of oil rents on economic growth and the role of governance in avoiding the
resource curse have received a great deal of attention from economists over the last decades,
and the table below summarizes the main empirical studies that have been conducted to examine
these relationships:
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Table 1. Empirical Evidence on the Link between Resource Curse, Institutional Quality
and Economic Growth
Authors

Sample

Empirical
approach
Ordinary Least
Squares
(OLS) regression

Bulte et al., (2005)

90 countries
1970-2001

Bhattacharyya
and Hodler (2010)

124 countries
1980-2004

Game-Theoretic
Model

Tsani (2013)

27 natural resourcerich countries
1996-2007

Libman (2013)

72 Russian regions
2000-2006

OLS, NeweyWest standard
errors, Panel
Corrected
Standard Errors
(PCSE)
Ordinary Least
Squares
(OLS) regression

Oskenbayev et al.,
(2013)

Kazakhstan
2001-2009

2SLS model,
GMM method

Papyrakis and
Gerlagh (2004)

47 countries
1975-1996

Andersen and
Aslaksen (2008)

90 countries
1970-1990, 1990-2000

Ordinary Least
Squares
(OLS) regression
LAD regression
and reweighted
least squares,
OLS

Brunnschweiler
(2008)

100 countries
1996-2000

OLS regressions,
two-stage least
squares (2SLS)
estimations

Torvik (2009)

87 countries
1972-2000

Mehrara (2009)

13 oil-exporting
countries
1965-2005

Ordinary Least
Squares
(OLS) regression
Ordinary Least
Squares
(OLS) regression

Alexeev and
Conrad (2011)

CIS countries
1996-2005

Ordinary Least
Squares
(OLS) regression,
95

Results
The
resource
abundance
negatively affects institutions
concerned with government
effectiveness and rule of law.
The link between resource rents
and corruption counts on the
quality
of
democratic
institutions.
Poor
institutional
quality
aggravates the tendency for
resource dependence.

Good institutional quality is the
main driving force behind the
positive effect
of natural
resources on growth rates.
Resource abundance is often
associated
with
corrupt
practices and weak institutions.
Corruption
appears
to
significantly dampen economic
growth.
-Rule of law exerts a significant
positive impact on economic
growth.
-Resource abundance has a
significant negative influence
on economic growth.
There is a significant positive
relationship
between
institutional
quality
and
economic growth.
More precisely, rule of law and
government
effectiveness
substantially raise the rate of
economic growth.
Institutional quality displays a
positive and significant effect
on economic growth.
A
sound
institutional
environment has a salient
positive influence on economic
growth.
Control of corruption has a
positive
and
statistically
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two-stage least
squares (2SLS)
regression

significant impact on economic
growth.

Boschini et al.,
(2013)

90-107 countries
1965-2005

Ordinary Least
Squares
(OLS) regression

Good institutional quality is a
prerequisite for
economic
growth.

Iqbal and Daly
(2014)

52
developing/transitional
economies
1996-2010

Generalized
Method of
Moments (GMM)

Control of corruption exhibits a
positive but
statistically insignificant impact
on economic growth.

Atkinson and
Hamilton (2003)

91 countries
1980-1995

Ordinary Least
Squares
(OLS) regression

Resource-rich countries with
good quality institutions attract
more investments.

Nili and Rastad
(2007)

12 oil economies, 78
non-oil countries
1960-2001

Generalized
Method of
Moments (GMM)

Weak financial institutions
seem to affect economic growth
negatively.

Carmignani
(2013)

84 countries
1970-2010

Ordinary Least
Squares
(OLS) regression

High-quality institutions
promote human development
through
reducing
income
inequality.

Hooshmand et al.,
(2013)

17 countries
2002- 2010

System-GMM
(SGMM)
dynamic panel

Good governance has a positive
and statistically significant
influence
on
financial
development.

James and
Aadland (2011)

3092 counties in the
United States
1980-1995

Natural resource abundance
tends to reduce real income per
capita.

Boyce and Emery
(2011)

50 U.S. states
1970–2001

Two-stage
generalized least
squares (GLS),
OLS
Ordinary Least
Squares
(OLS) regression

Bjorvatn and
Farzanegan
(2013)

120 countries
1982-2006

Generalized
Method of
Moments
(GMM), OLS
regression

Resource rents crowd out the
manufacturing sector and lead
to lower real GDP per capita.

El Anshasy and
Katsaiti (2013)

32 resource-abundant
countries and 47 nonresource countries
1984-2008

OLS regression,
2SLS model

Good governance, stronger
democratic institutions, and low
levels
of
corruption
significantly enhance economic
growth.

Source: Constructed By Authors
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3. Oil Rents, Economic Growth and Good Governance in Oil-Abundant
MENA Countries
3.1. Oil Rents and Challenges Confronting Oil-Abundant MENA Countries
Figure 1. The Real Price of Crude Oil ($/barrel), 1996-2016.

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Statistics database, the data are
available online at http://www.eia.gov (accessed 22/01/2016).

After reaching a peak of $147 per barrel in July 2008, oil prices sagged below $40 a barrel
at the beginning of 2009, thus restraining oil production and making GCC countries swallow
the bitterness of the crisis (IMF, 2009). Following the recovery in oil prices, MENA oil
exporters’ export earnings, fiscal and external balances began to improve during 2010-2011.
However, oil GDP growth rates have remained below pre-crisis peaks, crude oil production
also remained at significantly lower levels than before the crisis (IMF, 2010). Despite MENA
oil exporters' steadfastness in the face of the devastating impact of the global financial crisis,
these governments are still floundering in the waves stemming from oil dependency. In fact,
the significant shrinking of GCC countries’ considerable fiscal space has generated concerns
about these countries’ ability to carry out counter-cyclical policy to contain the mounting risk
of falling oil prices (IMF, 2013).
Oil prices dropped sharply by $60 to less than $50 a barrel in January 2015 compared to
July 2014. MENA oil exporters’ landscape punctuated by drastic declines in oil export revenues
that reached $360 billion in 2015, has underlined the collapse in these countries’ external
surpluses. In fact, the GCC's current-account surplus swung to a deficit of 0.25 percent of GDP
in 2015, while non-GCC oil exporters posted a current account deficit of 8¾ percent of GDP in
2015 (IMF, 2015). If oil prices stay low and remain in the dumps, then GCC countries are
expected to post stinging losses in oil royalties. This situation, combined with unchanged
spending, will cause the budget surplus in Kuwait and Qatar to dwindle, and will promptly turn
the fiscal surplus in Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman into a very large deficit, and of course
Bahrain will not be denied a galloping budget deficit (Mottaghi, 2015).
The plunge in oil prices has been driven not just by supply-side forces but also by the
expansion of shale oil production, OPEC's decision to defend its share of the global oil market,
and the expected relief of nuclear-related sanctions on Iran that could revive Iranian oil exports.
Given persistently lackluster global growth, China's slowing growth trajectory and the resulting
decline in global demand for oil, it is not surprising that oil prices have been driven sharply
lower (Husain et al., 2015).
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Figure 2. Oil Rents (% of GDP) in Oil-Abundant MENA Countries, 1996-2014.

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, the data are available online at: http://data.worldbank.org
(accessed 22/01/2016).

MENA oil exporters, heavily dependent on oil export revenues, are vulnerable to the triple
whammy of falling oil prices, expenditure cutback and sluggish growth. Indeed, falling oil
prices urge these governments to acclimate to the new situation by abruptly adjusting their
expenditure and revenue policies in order to achieve fiscal sustainability, safeguard
intergenerational equity, and leave policy makers more elbow room for maneuver. It's worth
mentioning that MENA oil-rich countries are not yet saving enough oil wealth for succeeding
generations (IMF, 2015).
Actually, the need for setting up precautionary buffers to cope with oil price volatility and
deal with emergencies has long been felt. Large buffers can allow for more reasonable and
gradual spending adjustment and mitigate the downward pressure that low oil prices exert on
economic growth, but even substantial buffers can be fully exhausted if oil prices continue to
slide. In contrast, countries with insufficient buffers need to urgently adjust their spending,
taking due account of their cyclical situation. It's also worth bearing in mind that the
composition of fiscal adjustment that matters most in avoiding future bottlenecks reveals a
strong tilt toward retrenching, to some extent, current spending, while maintaining high-return
public capital expenditures and priority social spending (IMF, 2015).

3.2. Economic Growth in Oil-Abundant MENA Countries
Figure 3. Gross Domestic Product, Constant Prices (percent change) in Oil-Abundant
MENA Countries, 1996-2016.

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, the data are available online at: http://www.imf.org/
(accessed 22/01/2016).
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MENA oil exporters' growth is expected to drop by 0.25-0.5 percentage point in 2016 and
fall sharply by 0.5-0.75 percentage point for the 2017–2018 period (IMF, 2015). Indeed, GCC
countries’ growth averaged 4.5 percent in 2014-2015 (IMF, 2014). GCC's non-oil growth is
expected to slow slightly to just below 4 percent for both 2015 and 2016 after reaching an
estimated 5.75 percent in 2014, especially in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Further, ongoing fiscal
consolidation efforts are projected to exert some downward pressure on GCC countries' GDP
growth in the short term (IMF, 2015). While, growth in non-GCC oil exporters is projected to
stay approximately flat in 2015 after growing by nearly 1.75 percent in 2014, noting that nonoil sectors in Iraq and Libya are still extremely vulnerable to ongoing internal strife (IMF,
2015). Regarding the lifting of sanctions against Iran and assumed improvements in the region’s
security situation, non-GCC growth is projected to pick up to 5 percent in 2016 and beyond
(IMF, 2015).
It is recognized that these growth projections are however subject to many large
uncertainties, notably those related to the future trajectory of global petroleum prices and
emerging-market economies’ growth prospects, since the recent plunge in oil prices and the
envisaged fiscal adjustment can create a bleak and pessimistic view of MENA oil exporters'
growth paths (IMF, 2015). In fact, the situation in Algeria and Iraq threatens to deteriorate
further, because these countries have failed to contain macro-financial risks posed by heavy
reliance on oil-related bank deposits, and credit exposure to state-owned companies whose
existence hinges mainly on oil rents. Simultaneously, the banking sector's situation is no better
in Yemen, due to its exposure to sovereign risk and the curse that has befallen the country's
fiscal indicators (IMF, 2015).
It should be stressed at the outset, however, that massive GCC's infrastructure
development continues at a robust pace, and provides a strong impetus towards a large-scale
expansion of tourism, construction, and transport, for which these countries' reputation on the
world stage keeps growing (IMF, 2014). As a matter of fact, the clear differences in economic
growth between the GCC countries and non-GCC MENA countries have been heightened by
the political turmoil that has spread across several non-GCC countries (IMF, 2014). Actually,
protracted conflicts in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, have not only drastically reduced growth rates
in these countries but also exacerbated the spread of prolonged symptoms to neighboring
countries. These struggles smashed the region-wide confidence-building process, threatening
growth prospects (IMF, 2015). Additionally, there are several potential channels through which
conflicts can influence economic activity. First, conflicts cause large-scale displacements,
losses in both physical and human capital, a destruction of established trade routes, and massive
damages to infrastructure and industrial facilities. Second, they engender and fan the flames of
uncertainty, and thereby undermining conflict-ridden countries' potential growth (IMF, 2015).
But the bitter truth is that these conflicts hit the poor hardest, since they lead to an increase
in military expenditures at expense of much-needed social spending (IMF, 2015).
On the other side, exhausted fiscal buffers will leave MENA oil exporters with no choice
but to expose the card of public spending cuts in order to fend off the looming crisis, but this
step entails not only decreased investment spending, but also adverse implications for future
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growth, especially in countries with paralyzed infrastructure, so a skewed spending towards
high-return investments is a key priority (IMF, 2015). Moreover, growth slowdown forced
China to back off its insatiable demand for oil, thus bringing crushing disappointments to
MENA oil exporters' GDP growth (IMF, 2015).

A Glance Back at the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009
Figure 4. Gross Domestic Product, Constant Prices (percent change) in Oil-Abundant
MENA Countries, 2007-2010.

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, the data are available online at: http://www.imf.org/
(accessed 22/01/2016).

The global financial meltdown has hit all MENA oil exporters (through the sharp decline
in oil prices, sharp drop in global demand, and abrupt reversals in capital flows), but to varying
degrees, it has been especially severe in the GCC countries. Oil sector activity has contracted
sharply in 2009; this alarming decline has led most governments to pursue vigorous countercyclical macroeconomic policies which have alleviated the hardship the crisis has brought upon
the non-oil sector. The crisis has also revealed unsurprising pockets of weakness in the banking
system, and has urged these governments to undertake unusual measures to cushion the impact
of the crisis that has been more severe than anticipated (IMF, 2009). However, crude oil
production has grown in 2010 and 2011 as oil prices have recovered, and world activity has
also expanded after the global recession of 2008-2009. Hence, oil GDP has picked up between
3.5 percent and 4.25 percent in 2010-2011, but it is still lower than pre-crisis levels. However,
MENA oil exporters’ economic activity has recovered in 2010, albeit at a moderate pace (IMF,
2010).

The Alarm Bells Are Ringing: The Dire Need for Economic Diversification
Away from Oil.
A high level of uncertainty surrounds the long-term prospects for oil futures prices that
seem to be continuing on the downward path, and there is no sign of improvement in the
foreseeable future, also the long term outlook remains bearish due to several reasons including
the following: the darkening global economic picture, the Eurozone slowdown, the deeperthan-expected slowdown in China, China’s first step towards less oil-intensive phase of
development, and the recent lifting of oil sanctions against Iran (Mottaghi, 2015).
It’s the closing curtain for oil boom; it's the moment of diversification away from oil; it’s
time for private sector job creation which is a target that MENA oil exporters really want to
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make happen, but it seems impossible, given the current security and fiscal situation in the
region. Notwithstanding some progress has been achieved towards economic diversification,
blind reliance on oil remains the economic mainstay of MENA oil-exporting economies.
Indeed, this is exactly what we should expect, if the private sector itself is heavily dependent
on public expenditure (IMF, 2015). A conventional wisdom says that emphasis on collecting
non-oil revenues can enhance the flexibility of an economy and increase its ability to respond
to adverse shocks (IMF, 2014).
Non-oil GDP growth seems, at first sight, much more closely tied to the oil price growth,
as the hike in oil prices boosts non-oil GDP growth by rising government spending. In most
MENA oil-exporting countries, non-oil GDP growth rates are now even more concentrated in
service industries that depend to a large extent on demand expansion resulted from oil sales,
and what makes matters worse is that non-oil sectors are poorly equipped to deal with
plummeting oil prices, so pursuing unsustainable fiscal policies may solidify non-oil GDP
growth in the medium-term (IMF, 2014). In fact, policies targeted at creating incentives,
enhancing skills in line with private sector's needs, and improving business climate may seem
far-fetched, but successful experiences of diversification show that they aren't.
In light of daunting challenges that lie ahead, IMF (2014) has announced several measures
that can be adopted to increase diversification, which in turn can better shield MENA oil
exporters against disruptive oil price shock, these measures include:
- Enhancing the quality and effectiveness of education and reducing the skills mismatch.
- Restraining discretionary spending by cutting down the public sector wage bill and
strengthening the private sector's employment- absorptive capacity.
- Phasing out energy subsidies that create an investment bias at the expense of labor and less
energy-intensive sectors.
- Stepping up strenuous efforts to implement trade facilitation, broaden the region's export base,
and develop a highly competitive and dynamic business environment.
- Beefing up security especially in conflict-ridden countries and recovering political stability
that helps woo FDI into non-resource tradable sectors.
- Facilitating access to finance and lessening the bureaucratic burden that weighs heavily on
private entrepreneurship.
- Enhancing transparency and intensifying anti-corruption efforts.
- Embarking on higher public infrastructure investment during oil boom periods.
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3.3. Good Governance in Oil-Abundant MENA Countries
Figure 5. Governance Index (The Simple Average of Six Worldwide Governance
Indicators) in Oil-Abundant MENA Countries, 1996-2014.

Source: World Bank Governance Indicators, the data are available online at:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed 22/01/2016).

In fact, there is a great deal of variability in governance quality across MENA oilexporting countries. GCC countries continue to dominate the top tier of good governance
scores, while non-GCC MENA countries lag behind comparator GCC countries in most, if not
all, governance indicators.
Figure 6. Governance Indicators in Oil-Abundant MENA Countries, 1996, 2010, 2014.

Source: World Bank Governance Indicators, the data are available online at:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed 22/01/2016).

For instance, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen score lowest on political stability, government
effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption; these factors are most responsible for
hamstrung private sector in these countries whose poor ranking is a crucial indication of where
oil wealth can warp institutions and hinder economic diversification. Without the existence of
sound governance that creates an appropriate and enabling environment, the private sector-led
growth can't be sustained or even achieved, like a fish can't live out of the water. This
governance vacuum makes non-GCC MENA countries more vulnerable to heavy losses in
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terms of per capita GDP growth (Akhtar, 2009), thus putting dismaying challenges for most
non-GCC MENA countries, notably those whose economies depend on external assistance or
foreign aid.
Poor governance fascinates economic agents and gets them interested in rent-seeking
activities rather than genuinely productive ones, and this situation has been exacerbated by
corruption-prone institutions that are spiraling out of control. It’s worthwhile to mention that,
all non-GCC MENA countries scored low in the Corruption Perception Index of TI, while UAE
has been adjudged to be the least corrupt country in the region. Additionally, half-way reforms
have so far failed to forestall the ravages of corruption, triggering instability and making public
resources a prey by opening the floodgates to powerful political predators, and it will not be
surprising at all if the next generation becomes a victim.
Yemen and Iraq, plagued by political instability and terrorist attacks, have been listed as
the 7th, and 12th most fragile states, respectively, according to the Fragile States Index for
2015, and they are the MENA region’s most utterly failed states (Fund for Peace, 2015). In light
of the Arab awakening, it becomes clear that being aware of tyrannical and oppressive actions,
and demanding more transparency and accountability are the evidence that the current
economic and political situation descends from the delusive peace, wonky institutional
framework and misguided governance policies. The Arab spring has unveiled deep-rooted
governance problems, but there has been very little improvement in the area of good governance
since then.
Perhaps it is not surprising that sustaining the status quo is not just a sign of the ceaseless
triumph of private over public interests, but it may seem rather a stratagem for plundering the
wealth without much fuss. In fact, public service delivery took a drastic turn for the worse due
in large part to deeply entrenched governance failures that exerted a colossal drag on public
investment management (Heidenhof, 2014).
If we take a closer look, it seems that weak governance and poor public service delivery
go hand-in-hand. It is of paramount importance to emphasize here the significance of higher
education to a country's future prospects for good governance. Universities are not only places
where tomorrow's leaders are born, but they are also places for preparing forceful, effective and
meaningful civil society participation in the governance process, through injecting the ideas of
good governance into the minds of today's youth (Mbi and Jaramillo, 2010). In this way, higher
education feeds the roots of tomorrow's institutions, providing a fertile breeding ground for
governance prospects. In other words, today's higher education landscape can sculpt the major
features of tomorrow's good governance.
The World Bank is taking the lead on laying the groundwork upon which MENA
countries can build more transparent and credible state institutions, strengthen government
accountability, support open government policies, and enhance the rule of law. Because the
World Bank’s support can help these countries overcome several drawbacks that hinder good
governance and frustrate diversification efforts, such as large and inefficient public sector,
excessive state centralization, rampant public spending mismanagement, poor access to
information, barriers to authentic civic participation, lack of transparency, turning blind eyes
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on corrupt practices, incongruence between legislation and its implementation (Heidenhof,
2014).
It certainly is clear that deeply entrenched governance issues cannot be solved overnight;
visible and tangible improvements in governance are going to take time, they may sound simple,
but they require long-term commitment and great efforts on everyone's part, this laborious
process can bring fruitful results to each country engaged in such endeavor only if it is not
carried out on a one-size-fits-all basis. As long as these governments sought to borrow ideas
and successful models that don’t fit their own institutional contexts, interests and needs, the
achievement of good governance can happen only in dreams and can’t end up coming true.

4. Data and Empirical Results
A. Data
The present paper aims, on the one hand, to test the impact of oil rents on economic
growth and examine the main symptoms of the resource curse phenomenon in oil-abundant
MENA countries, and on the other hand, to investigate the role of governance in avoiding the
resource curse and turning oil rents into a tool for economic diversification in 11 MENA oil
exporters (Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen) over the period 1996-2014, this time period has been chosen on the basis
of data availability for the following variables:
GDP: GDP per capita growth (annual %) is used as a proxy for economic growth, from the
World Development Indicators database.
OILR: Oil rents (% of GDP) (they represent the difference between the value of crude oil
production at world prices and total costs of production), from the World Development
Indicators database.
AGR: Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), from the World Development Indicators database.
IND: Industry, value added (% of GDP), from the World Development Indicators database.
SER: Services, etc., value added (% of GDP), from the World Development Indicators
database.
DIV: The export diversification index indicates whether the export structure of each country or
country grouping differs from the world patterns, this index takes values between 0 (a high
degree of diversification) and 1(a low degree of diversification), the data are from UNCTAD's
database.
CONC: The export concentration index shows how exports of individual countries or country
groupings are concentrated on several products or otherwise distributed in a more homogeneous
manner among a series of products, this index takes values between 0 (minimum concentration)
and 1 (maximum concentration), the data are from UNCTAD's database.
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GI: presents the Governance Index which is constructed as a simple average of the following
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators: Voice and Accountability (VA), Political
Stability and Absence of Violence (PSAV), Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory
Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), Control of Corruption (CC), these indicators range from -2.5
(bad) to 2.5 (good), the data are from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) database.
EF: Economic Freedom is used as a proxy for economic institutions, introduced by Heritage
Foundation and Wall Street Journal, this indicator is graded on a scale of 0 (repressed) to 100
(free).

B. Data Analysis Tools
This paper uses a panel data analysis due to its ability to control the impact of
heterogeneity (both observed and unobserved), this analysis is also effective in reducing
degrees of freedom and addressing collinearity problems, thus producing substantially better
results (Hsiao 2003). Besides using the pooled OLS model, fixed effects model and random
effects model, the Generalized-Method of-Moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator proposed
by Arellano and Bond (1991) and developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998), is also employed due to its ability to deal with persistent data, neglected
endogeneity and heterogeneity issues by using and selecting valid instrumental variables.

C. Analysis of Empirical Results
Table 2. Summary Statistics

Source: Author’s Computation Using Eviews 8.0.

The Table 2 presents the summary statistics for all variables included in the empirical
study, covering 11 oil-abundant MENA countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen) over the period 1996-2014. As
can be readily seen from this data, GDP has an average of 1.126 and a maximum value of
104.657, reflecting that there are certainly large regional differences in growth rates. Also, the
average of oil rents is 32.26 and its maximum value is 68.851, indicating that most MENA oil
exporters are heavily dependent on oil export revenues. Whilst, the average diversification
index of 0.7731 confirms that the blind reliance on oil remains the economic mainstay of
MENA oil-exporting economies; further, this poor diversification is blamed for today’s growth
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in the region. While, governance index (GI) has a mean value of -0.4079, reflecting that the
region as a whole performs poorly in terms of governance.
Table 3. Regression Results for 11 Oil-Abundant MENA countries

Source: Author’s Computation Using Eviews 8.0.

The Table 3 reports the results of three different estimation techniques: pooled OLS, fixed
effects and random effects models. All explanatory variables tend to have statistically
significant coefficients with the expected signs in all regression, except the diversification index
and governance index that appear to be insigniﬁcant in the random effects model, indicating
that the triptych diversification-governance-oil rents has a crucial role to play in maintaining
sound economic growth. Thus, the choice between fixed and random effects models will be
made based on the Hausman test.
Table 4. Hausman Test

Source: Author’s Computation Using Eviews 8.0.

The Hausman chi-square test statistic is statistically significant at the 5% level of
significance (Prob (0.0404 < 0.05)) (see Table 4), then the null hypothesis is rejected in favor
of the alternative hypothesis, in other words the Hausman test shows that the fixed effects model
is the appropriate one, so we focus on it in this empirical study. On this basis, it is concluded
that diversification, good governance and oil rents strengthen the foundation on which MENA
oil exporters’ sustainable growth can be built. In order to examine the main symptoms of the
resource curse phenomenon in oil-abundant MENA countries, we estimated several models
shown in Table 5.
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Table 5. Regression Results for 11 Oil-Abundant MENA countries

Source: Author’s Computation Using Eviews 8.0.

Results for each of the seven models are presented in the Table 5; MENA oil exporters’
growth is greatly and positively influenced by oil rents that can serve as a crucial funding source
for many other sectors (see column (a)). The fixed effect OLS regression in column (b) reveals
that oil rents exhibit a statistically significant positive effect on economic growth at the 5%
level of significance, while most of the other explanatory variables (agriculture, industry, and
services) have statistically insignificant coefficients with unexpected signs, and this can be
explained by the fact that the oil sector leaves no room for investing in the other non-oil sectors.
Column (c) indicates a positive and highly significant effect of oil rents on diversification index
(in other words, higher oil rents leads to poor diversification, since a high diversification score
indicates a low level of diversification), because oil rents encourage seeking a piece of the
resource pie instead of engaging in productive activities, and they are strong enough to keep
the doors locked in front of diversification strategies. As shown in column (d), concentration
appears to be strongly positively influenced by oil rents that act as a powerful magnet for rentseeking activities. Based on the results in column (e), oil rents carry the expected positive sign
with high significance, whilst most of the other explanatory variables (agriculture, industry, and
services) maintain statistically insignificant coefficients with unexpected signs, reflecting that
the dependence on oil rents causes the concentration of economic activity in oil-rich MENA
countries. Column (f) shows that there is a negative association between oil rents and
governance, highlighting the fact that the overwhelming reliance on oil rents generates a poor
governance framework, which in turn frustrates efforts at economic diversification. The results
in the column (g) illustrates that economic freedom is significantly adversely affected by oil
rents, since these oil revenues make building high-quality economic institutions more arduous.
On the basis of these findings, it is concluded that MENA oil exporters have been diagnosed
with resource curse. In order to examine the role of governance in avoiding the resource curse
in oil-abundant MENA countries, strengthening the foundation on which economic
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diversification can be built, and turning oil rents into a tool for diversifying the economy, we
estimated several models (shown in Table 6) in which each governance indicator was analyzed
separately for avoiding the problems of interdependence or collinearity between governance
indicators.
Table 6. Regression Results for 11 Oil-Abundant MENA countries

Source: Author’s Computation Using Eviews 8.0.

The fixed effects GMM estimation results for each of the eight models are presented in
the Table 6; governance index is negatively and significantly linked to the diversification index
(see column (a)) (in other words, higher governance index leads to higher diversification, since
a low diversification score indicates a high level of diversification), indicating that governance
is a key ingredient in the diversification recipe. Likewise, oil rents display a significant positive
impact on diversification index in 11 oil-rich MENA countries, and this is consistent with
theory, that highlights the influential role of oil rents in encouraging rent-seeking activities and
frustrating economic diversification. The multiplicative interaction term between governance
index and oil rents yields a significant negative coefficient, implying that the combined effect
of governance and oil rents is effective in promoting diversification; further, this term is strong
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enough to overcome the diversification-decreasing effect of oil rents, indicating that the
enhancement of MENA oil exporters’ governance situation allows oil rents to serve as a crucial
funding source for many other sectors and enhance economic diversification. It is also worth
noting that the validity of our instruments is confirmed, because the Hansen J-statistic of over
identifying restrictions is insignificant (J-statistic p-value = 0.07413 >0.05) and therefore the
null hypothesis of valid instruments cannot be rejected. As shown in column (b), governance
index is broken down into six indicators in order to figure out which of those indicators matter
the most for economic diversification; the diversification index appears to be strongly
negatively influenced by voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, and
control corruption, hence, these four pillars support a diversification away from over-reliance
on oil in MENA oil exporters. Column (c) reports the fixed effects GMM estimation results
using the multiplicative interaction term between ‘voice and accountability’ and oil rents, this
term yields a highly significant negative coefficient, indicating that the combined effect of
‘voice and accountability’ and oil rents is effective in boosting efforts to diversify oil-rich
economies in the MENA region, because voice and accountability can ensure the pursuit of the
public interest and prevent resource-rent dissipation by monitoring those in authority and
holding them accountable and thus economic diversification can be initiated and guided. As
shown in column (d), the multiplicative interaction term between political stability and oil rents
yields a significant negative coefficient, reflecting that the joint impact of political stability and
oil rents is effective in boosting economic diversification, because political stability and
absence of violence induce politicians' tendency towards the efficient use of oil rents, thus
laying the basis for economic diversification, they also create and maintain a favorable
environment in which non-oil sectors can flourish. Based on the results in column (e), the
multiplicative interaction term between government effectiveness and oil rents carries the
expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 5-percent level, implying that the
combined effect of ‘government effectiveness’ and oil rents is of paramount importance in
accelerating diversification, because government effectiveness enables MENA oil-exporters to
wisely use oil rents in a way that can substantially contribute to the economic diversification
by enhancing the ability of civil servants to deliver quality public services and requiring them
to implement good oil management policies according to diversification requirements. Column
(f) shows that there is a negative significant association between the multiplicative interaction
term (RQ*OILR) and diversification index, this can be explained by the fact that the presence
of regulatory quality makes it easier for oil-rich MENA governments to pursue market-friendly
policies and avoid excessive regulatory burdens, thereby further heightening diversification and
leaving oil sector in private hands. Column (g) illustrates that the relationship between the
multiplicative interaction term (RL*OILR) and diversification index is negative and significant
at the 10 percent level, since the rule of law curtails the ruling elite's attempt to use oil rents to
further their own interests and leaves room for diversification through contributing to a more
business- and citizen-friendly environment. A quick glance at the column (h) reveals that
control of corruption protects oil rents from the ravenous behavior of bad politicians, and
improves the management of oil rents and hence it can best serve the diversification process,
because the multiplicative interaction term (CC*OILR) is highly statistically significant and
has the expected sign. It is also worth noting that the validity of our instruments in eight models
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is confirmed, since the Hansen J-statistic of over identifying restrictions is insignificant in each
model and therefore the null hypothesis of valid instruments cannot be rejected.
In a nutshell, the enhancement of MENA oil-exporters’ good governance capabilities is
the way out of the resource curse because it is the only mediator that can reconcile the twin
goals of diversifying economic activity and yielding benefits from oil endowment, hence
turning oil wealth into a boon, or more simply put, the building up of good governance can
offer these oil-abundant countries more opportunities for economic diversification and give
them much greater immunity to resource trap and thereby can enable them to generate robust
and sustainable economic growth.

V. Conclusion
The present paper aims, on the one hand, to test the impact of oil rents on economic
growth and examine the main symptoms of the resource curse phenomenon in oil-abundant
MENA countries, and on the other hand, to investigate the role of governance in avoiding the
resource curse and turning oil rents into a tool for economic diversification in 11 MENA oil
exporters (Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen) over the period 1996-2014, by using pooled OLS, fixed effects, random
effects and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. The main findings indicate that
the triptych oil rents-governance- diversification has a crucial role to play in maintaining sound
economic growth. Oil rents exhibit a statistically significant positive effect on economic
growth, while most of the other explanatory variables (agriculture, industry, and services) have
statistically insignificant coefficients with unexpected signs, and this can be explained by the
fact that the oil sector leaves no room for investing in the other non-oil sectors. Further, the
dependence on oil rents keeps the doors locked in front of diversification strategies and causes
the concentration of economic activity. The results also show that the overwhelming reliance
on oil rents generates a poor governance framework and makes building high-quality economic
institutions more arduous. On the basis of these findings, it is concluded that MENA oil
exporters have been diagnosed with resource curse. Thus, it can be said that the composition of
fiscal adjustment that matters most in avoiding future bottlenecks reveals a strong tilt toward
retrenching, to some extent, current spending, while maintaining high-return public capital
expenditures and priority social spending. Indeed, stepping up strenuous efforts to implement
trade facilitation, broaden the region's export base, and develop a highly competitive and
dynamic business environment, and strengthening the private sector's employment- absorptive
capacity, will provide oil-rich MENA countries with greater insulation from the resource curse.
Further, the fixed effects GMM estimation results reveal that governance is a key
ingredient in the diversification recipe, while, oil rents frustrate economic diversification by
encouraging rent-seeking activities. The multiplicative interaction term between governance
index and oil rents indicates that the combined effect of these two variables is effective in
promoting diversification, in other words, the enhancement of MENA oil-exporters’
governance situation allows oil rents to serve as a crucial funding source for many other sectors
and enhance economic diversification. Moreover, economic diversification appears to be
strongly positively influenced by voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory quality,
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and control corruption, and hence these four pillars support a diversification away from overreliance on oil in MENA oil-exporters. To sum up, the enhancement of MENA oil-exporters’
good governance capabilities is the way out of the resource curse because it is the only mediator
that can reconcile the twin goals of diversifying economic activity and yielding benefits from
oil endowment, hence turning oil wealth into a boon, or more simply put, the building up of
good governance can offer these oil-abundant countries more opportunities for economic
diversification and give them much greater immunity to resource trap and thereby can enable
them to generate robust and sustainable economic growth.
Oil-abundant MENA countries must change track to ride the wave of prosperity and attain
robust and sustainable growth rates by focusing on economic diversification and enhancing
good governance. In pursuit of these goals, policy makers should take into account that the first
step in embarking on promising diversification processes is to build a thoughtful and
measurable plan with realistic, clearly defined, and action-oriented goals, and it's worth
mentioning that this plan should be executable. It's also worth bearing in mind that deeply
entrenched governance issues in most MENA oil exporters cannot be solved overnight; visible
and tangible improvements in governance are going to take time, they may sound simple, but
they require long-term commitment and great efforts on everyone's part, this laborious process
can bring fruitful results to each country engaged in such endeavor only if it is not carried out
on a one-size-fits-all basis, and last but not least, it is extremely important to realize that
insisting on change for the better and stepping up strenuous efforts to enhance the quality and
effectiveness of education can ensure that future generations will be sufficiently vigilant in
safeguarding their rights and shielding their economies against potentially damaging shocks.
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